Where's My Nutcracker?

I've noticed that some bloggers believe that sending 500,000 troops into Iraq would have
been a better plan than the current war strategy. That's exactly how many troops we had in
Vietnam (actually 541,000) -- how did Vietnam work out? I'll tell you how -- we lost 58,226 KIA or MIA. In 1968 we were losing 1,388 military personnel per MONTH or 2100% more than the average monthly casualties in Iraq.

These critics remind me of Democrats - you know, the ones that think they can run this war better than the military.

Think of Iraq as a walnut. Should we crack it with a nutcracker or with a sledgehammer? If you use a sledgehammer you destroy the important part of the nut - in this case, the civilian population inside. Choosing the sledgehammer is the route of simplistic, childlike, Rambo inspired ignorance. The nutcracker is used with a bit more skill: too much pressure still cracks the meat of the nut, too little doesn't break down the hard outer shell.

The critic's first mistake is forgetting that we already won the war for Iraq. The Iraqi Republican Guards folded like a geisha's fan; we are now fighting an insurgency that hides among non-combatant civilians. Should we sledgehammer the civilians too??

The second and most telling mistake made by these pseudo-military geniuses is to equate MASS with victory. MASS is the military term that means having the forces you need in the right place, at just the right time. It is less about having overwhelming strength at all times. When fighting an insurgent force, you would have to have bodies on every street corner in every town to ensure enough MASS to ensure a rapid counter-attack. Even then, massive numbers provide no benefit.
It is counter-intuitive, but true, that the more troops you have, the less efficient your counter-insurgent tactics become. You are constantly seen as the Stormtroopers; this constant presence becomes an irritant in and of itself. Those troops are constant targets.
And what do you do with all those forces? After a sneak attack, if the insurgent runs into a mosque full of Mooselimbs, do you level the mosque? That is the main advantage given by massive numbers; being able to obliterate the enemy at the point of attack. Are the critics saying we should level mosques in order to kill one Islamofascist? If so, then we do need 500,000 troops.
It is better to have MANEUVER and ECONOMY OF FORCE. This creates more agility and reduces targets of opportunity. When attacked by one Islamofascist, you develop MASS, then use small team tactics to clear the mosque (rather than nukes). More importantly, you use agile forces to develop intel, then track and hunt the enemy. You hit and run, using their own tactics against them. They never know when you're coming and it's harder for them to target you.

If we were fighting this battle using Napoleonic rules of war we would line up our troops, and they'd line up theirs, then charge at each other. Insurgent war requires a distinctly different battle plan. We must adjust to their tactics as they adjust to ours on a tactical level, not a strategic one.
Strategically we also lack the troops necessary to maintain 500,000 in country. Thanks to the cuts during the 1990's we're lucky to limit rotations to their already extensive lengths.

Remember that we defeated the Iraqi Republican Guard not with massive numbers of troops, we did it with MANEUVER; employing MASS only when we faced the enemy on open ground. Tommy Franks was brilliant in drawing enemy forces out of the cities and into the open.

Having too many troops during an insurgency only creates more sitting ducks for the hit and run tactics of insurgents (see: Vietnam above), unless you impose absolute and tyrannical martial law to control movement of the populace (see: North Korea). Still, martial law risks the formation of an underground. Even the Fwench formed an underground during WWII -- what does that tell you? Insurgents will strike at you at any time; or, not strike you and wait for you to leave, then undo all of your work.

In this battle, the way to defeat an insurgency is to get the populace on your side as you create the Iraqi institutions that will govern. This is the nutcracker and this is where we failed. Paul Bremer had no real plan for replacing the Sunni Baathists, resulting in a void of Iraqi civilian leadership. Unemployment sky-rocketed as infrastructure collapsed. The dethroned Sunni Baathists and unemployed Iraqi men formed elements of the insurgency. The walnut shell hardened as life became harder for the populace. Who did they blame for their lower standards of living? The first people they saw - the American military.

What would you do if an invading Fwench army took away your job, you were unable to provide for your families, had no electricity, and difficulty finding potable water? I'm sure you'd think "Well, this sucks. Let me sit here on my ass and not do anything about it."
I certainly wouldn't. The invading Fwench army would be feeling the sting in short order. This was Iraq, thanks to the short-sightedness of our civilian reconstruction planners.

In case you didn't know, the military has always been and will always be just one more arm of diplomacy. But, without the work of other diplomatic forces, the military is left as "targets of opportunity". How is the Army handling this? They are the ones reaching out to the people. Read my interview with JACK ARMY to see for yourself.

Their third error is not understanding that the Sunni triangle is the only really violent portion left in Iraq. The Kurds are administering the north and fighting the insurgents. In the south, Sunnis are greatly outnumbered and dare not open a can of worms. Meanwhile, don't blame the Army or the war planners for not having enough people on the ground. This is not the problem. With today's weapons the "boots on ground" could level the Sunni Triangle in just a few days, if they wanted. The problem was that the people holding the nutcracker never used one before. That initial failure allowed an insurgency to take hold. Al-Qaeda saw the opening and joined them.

Today, the populace is beginning to turn against the insurgency. The Anbar Salvation Council is one example of tribes banding together, in coalition with Iraqi Security Forces, to battle Al-Qaeda. Will it continue?

Only if we can prove to the Iraqi people that we are there to help.